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This article is about the governance of expectations of forensic DNA
phenotyping (FDP) innovations in Germany used for the prediction of
human externally visible traits such as eye, hair, and skin color, as well as
biological age and biogeographic ancestry. In 2019, FDP technologies were
regulated under the label “extended DNA analysis”. We focus on the
expectations of members of the forensic genetics’ community in Germany, in
anticipation and response to those of regulators who advocated for such
technologies. Confronted with regulators’ expectations of omnipotent
technologies and the optimistic promise that they will enhance public
security, forensic geneticists responded with attempts to adjust such
expectations, specifying limits and risks, along with a particular logic sorting
matters of concern. We reflect on how forensic geneticists’ govern
expectations through forms of distributed anticipatory governance,
delimiting their obligations, and distributing accountability across the
criminal justice system.
Keywords: forensic geneticists; sociology of expectations; forensic DNA
phenotyping; anticipatory governance; accountability
Introduction
Forensic DNA phenotyping (FDP) is a bundle of DNA analysis technologies that
have emerged for the prediction of human physical characteristics, including exter-
nally visible traits such as the color of eyes, hair, and skin, as well as biological age
and biogeographic ancestry. These technologies aim to provide typological infor-
mation about common, but varying, personal features by drawing on population-
based probabilities. In the realm of criminal investigation, this set of technologies
is applied to unidentified DNA stains found at crime scenes. FDP’s overall promise
is linked to the ability to narrow down groups of criminal suspects and thus
improve criminal investigations and increase public security.
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Already for some time transnational networks of forensic geneticists have been
researching and debating the aforementioned FDP technologies (Wienroth 2020).
Yet, the technologies have entered the regulations of criminal law in only a few
countries (Samuel and Prainsack 2018a, 2019). By the end of 2019, FDP
became regularized in Germany in the aftermath of a particularly high-profile crim-
inal case1 that took place in Freiburg in the regional state of Baden-Württemberg in
October 2016, after intense debate about their legitimacy, proportionality, and ade-
quate solutions to regulate them (Lipphardt 2018).
The Freiburg criminal case received overwhelming media interest in the context
of debating for and against new forensic technologies able to predict externally
visible characteristics and biogeographic ancestry (Lipphardt 2018). An asylum
seeker turned out to be the perpetrator whose outward appearance was different
from that of the German majority population. The subsequent media attention pre-
dominantly represented views of an unsafe society using outdated forensic technol-
ogies and raised highly optimistic public expectations around forensic DNA
technologies, suggesting that FDP provided an easily available solution to
enhance public security (Weitz and Buchanan 2017).
The criminal case and the subsequent discussions gave rise to proposals for using
FDP and such proposals entered the policy debate in using the label of “extended
DNA analysis” to refer to FDP technologies. While the term FDP circulates
among the forensic genetics community, the term “extended DNA analysis” was
established in the policy debate in Germany to describe the political project to regu-
late a specific selection of FDP technologies available for use in the criminal inves-
tigation. The following sentence was added to the existing legislation (German
Code on Criminal Procedure (StPO) § 81e) which regulates the use of forensic
DNA analysis: “If it is unknown from which person the trace material comes,
additional determinations about the eye, hair, and skin color, as well as the age of
the person, can be made” (Bundesministerium der Justiz und für Verbraucherschutz
2019a).
Before the draft law’s finalization, the Federal Ministry of Justice and Consumer
Protection initiated a consultation process and invited a range of stakeholders’ advi-
sory opinions on the draft law which were made public through the Ministry. Advi-
sory opinions of diverse stakeholders were received articulating diverse supportive
or critical responses (Bundesministerium der Justiz und für Verbraucherschutz
2019a). Claims of stakeholders gathered around the technological potential of
FDP, its readiness, and its application possibilities in criminal investigation
versus its potential harm to fundamental rights. In the reasoning which
accompanied the draft law for amending the StPO to incorporate FDP, the govern-
mental parties proposing the draft stated:
According to current scientific knowledge, the externally visible body characteristics
can be determined by examining genetic information with sufficient predictive
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accuracy [own translation and own emphasis]. (Bundesministerium der Justiz und für
Verbraucherschutz 2019b, 30)
Federal regulators agreed on the assessment of sufficient accuracy for a specific set
of FDP technologies. Yet, the federal and state initiatives to regulate the emergent
technologies had included and justified different selections of technologies. Both
had incorporated the prediction of eye, hair, and skin color as well as age. Yet,
the federal law avoided selecting “biogeographic origin”, unlike the Bavarian
Police Law. The motif for excluding biogeographic ancestry was justified by pol-
icymakers by its apparent potential to discriminate against certain population
groups (Rath 2019). The minister of justice, Christine Lambrecht, explained its
exclusion by warning of the potential harm against minority groups: “However,
it can result in larger groups being pilloried, such as all Africans or all Asians”
(Rath 2019, 2, own translation). While the prediction of biogeographic origin
was not included in the federal law, prediction of skin color was incorporated.
The argumentation of the minister to include skin color followed the logic of clas-
sifying skin color as the outer appearance which likewise might be reported by an
eye-witness: “If a witness says that the perpetrator was dark-skinned, the police are
already looking for a dark-skinned perpetrator” (Rath 2019, 2, own translation).
The general use of FDP technologies in law enforcement for solving crimes in
the responsibility of the federal level followed once a single state – out of
sixteen states in Germany – already had surged ahead and created precedents in
terms of regulation in the context of preventive policing. Already in 2018, the
Police Law in the South German state of Bavaria had included FDP technologies
in the context of preventive police actions (Bayerische Staatskanzlei 2018) averting
“imminent danger”. The amended Bavarian state law authorized the use of the fol-
lowing FDP technologies, the prediction of eye, hair and skin color as well as age
and biogeographic ancestry, “to investigate people they deem an ‘imminent
danger’[,] persons who have not necessarily committed any crimes but might be
planning to do so” (Vogel 2018). The Bavarian legislator justified the demand
for FDP technologies in a context of counter-terrorism measures to prevent poten-
tial mass shootings or terrorist attacks which emphasized a notion of security linked
to the requirement of acting “before the formation and identification of a determi-
nate threat” (Anderson 2010, 792).
The introduction of FDP in Germany is an exemplary case of contemporary state
security policies focusing on diverse potential future threats and dangers of unpre-
dictable nature as a legitimizing carrier for particular pre-emptive actions and
overall “risk group” oriented data-driven surveillance measures (Pavone, Santiago
Gomez, and Jaquet-Chifelle 2016). At the same time, the regional state law, as well
as the federal law amendments oriented to enhance FDP technologies, were
accompanied by the political rhetoric of security enhancement along with tremen-
dous expectations about their availability, capabilities, accuracy, and efficiency. In
this paper, we focus on the expectations of members of the forensic genetics’
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community in Germany, in anticipation and response to those of regulators who
advocated for such technologies. Confronted with regulators’ expectations of
omnipotent technologies forensic geneticists responded with attempts to adjust
such expectations, specifying limits and risks, along with a particular logic
sorting matters of concern. Our focus is to explore how forensic geneticists
managed expectations within their community of practice as an attempt to lower
and adjust expectations around seemingly omnipotent technologies, but also con-
tributed to the governance of expectations with proposals of (self-)regulation to
prevent potential harm.
Previous works on the views about FDP by the members of the European com-
munity of forensic geneticists have shown that this professional group carve out
notions of risks emerging from the uses of these technologies in the criminal
justice system, and claim that strict accountability is needed (Wienroth 2018,
2020; Granja and Machado 2020). This paper aims to contribute to deepening
the understanding of forms of assigning and distributing accountability, and the
specific role of the community of forensic geneticists in governing expectations
of FDP innovation in German society. One of these studies, conducted by
Wienroth, proposed the notion of “anticipatory (self)governance” to focus on
“the role which researchers and users of technologies have in the framing of emer-
ging technologies as responsive to specific operational challenges, and eventually
the adoption of technology into practice” (Wienroth 2018, 12).
We take inspiration from Wienroth’s work on anticipatory (self)governance, but
we also will assess as much this notion allows for a critical consideration of the dis-
cursive articulations of forensic geneticists’ attempts to govern expectations of
FDP. In this article, we propose to make use of the analytical repertoires from
the sociology of expectations, sociology of innovations, and critical security
studies that together contribute to expanding and deepening the understanding of
the interrelations between expectation management within the epistemic commu-
nity of forensic geneticists, the governance of expectations of security innovations,
and policymaking in the context of emergent security technologies. We will suggest
the term distributed anticipatory governance which goes beyond self-governance
to look at what matters of concerns evolve in discursively articulated expectations
of forensic geneticists and how governance accountability for FDP technologies is
assigned in a distributive manner.
Governing expectations of forensic genetic innovations
The sociology of expectations is an account that has explored future-oriented dis-
courses together with new and emerging technology innovations. Its interest lies in
studying rhetorical visions and how they are performative in the way of how they
serve to enable some technoscientific worlds and to disable others (van Lente and
Rip 1998; Borup et al. 2006). While lots of attention has been paid to expectations
and hypes (Borup et al. 2006), some attention has been paid to low expectations
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(Gardner, Samuel, and Williams 2015). Little attention has been paid to how expec-
tation management of lowering expectations to maintain credibility and legitimacy
for technologies takes place. Yet, a small, nascent body of work on low expec-
tations has drawn attention to the less-promissory visions of the future that accom-
pany biomedical innovation projects. This work has examined the nature of “low
expectations” and what role they might play in innovation projects as a whole
(Gardner, Samuel, and Williams 2015). Tutton (2011, 419) for instance studied
the biotech industry tackling back and forth between pessimistic and optimistic
forecasts of equally conditional futures.
Critical security studies have explored how the reference to security moves
matters from regular politics into the realm of security thereby enabling extraordi-
nary measures to be considered as proportionate measures. Studies on the securiti-
zation (Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde 1998) of specific technologies (Amicelle,
Aradau, and Jeandesboz 2015) have looked into how security practitioners
engage politically to garner support for the countermeasures and actions which
already need to be taken in the present (Kester et al. 2020). In this article, we
explore the security technologies of FDP which forensic geneticists problematize
themselves to adjust and redirect overly enthusiastic political support for seemingly
omnipotent technologies. By doing so we also study how they respond to dominant
normative security visions increasingly demonstrating the seemingly inevitable tra-
deoffs with restricting civic rights and freedom (Pavone, Santiago Gomez, and
Jaquet-Chifelle 2016) and producing discriminatory pitfalls deriving from value-
loaded categorizations of suspicion/non-suspicion population groups (Leese 2014).
Kester et al. (2020) have provided an important attempt to bring together insights
from theories of sociology of expectation and critical security studies which
provide an important foundation to our article. They characterize both scholarly tra-
ditions as follows:
one logic [is] detailing the performativity of desirable futures with its desire to change
certain aspects of the present [sociology of expectations] and one [is] detailing the
performativity of undesirable futures to preserve or stabilize the present [critical
security studies]. (Kester et al. 2020, 89)
Professionals developing and working with security technologies tend to normalize
and take securitization demands and a “focus on futures through threats, dangers,
catastrophes, or other perceived events” (Kester et al. 2020) that negatively
impact futures rather for granted. The way they mobilize expectations about tech-
nologies may follow different logics deriving from the respective epistemic com-
munities’ frame of reference and in response to regulators’ mobilized
expectations and potential hypes featuring security technologies to prevent undesir-
able futures.
As we will show in our analysis, the community of forensic geneticists in
Germany actively participates in reactive management of expectations, or what
Brown and Michael (2003) in their seminal work have called deploying prospects
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of futures of the new technology at stake, which derive from retrospected futures
linked to forensic genetic technologies in general which have been overly enthu-
siastic in the past (Amelung, Granja, and Machado 2020).
Hielscher and Kivimaa (2019) building on Konrad and Alvial Palavicino (2017,
190) have approached the dynamics of “governance by expectations” which they
understand as the intentional use of expectations to legitimize the implementation
of policy and technology innovation. In the German regulation process of FDP, we
may see governance of security technologies by expectations, regulators envision-
ing threats such as severe crimes like the Freiburg murder case, to justify the
demand, necessity, and relevance of forensic technologies in the present as
means of prevention. At the same time, forensic geneticists as we will see in the
analysis, seem to contribute to what Hielscher and Kiviima called “governance
of expectations” towards FDP technologies. They respond to overly optimistic
expectations towards technologies by proposing particular regulatory setups for
technological configurations and fixing expectations towards specific enactments
of technologies. They do so by considering selected matters of concern relevant
to create legitimacy in the epistemic community of forensic genetics and the
wider publics of security policies.
Wienroth proposed the notion of “anticipatory (self)governance” in order to
focus on “the role which researchers and users of technologies have in the
framing of emerging technologies as responsive to specific operational challenges,
and eventually the adoption of a technology into practice” (Wienroth 2018, 12). He
identified distinct types of anticipatory ordering devices which together prepare the
adoption space for the uptake of technologies: (a) aspirational regimes to orient
rationalizing and operationalizing research and technology, (b) standard stan-
dard-setting to harmonize training and methodologies for testing, analysis, and
interpretation of FDP technologies and (c) projected applications and trainings
for such applications. We take from Wienroth the focus on anticipatory (self)gov-
ernance and selected ordering devices, but also will critically assess as much they
allow for a critical consideration of the discursive articulations of forensic geneti-
cists’ attempts to govern expectations of FDP technologies.
Methodology
This article is based on a qualitative interpretative methodology analyzing semi-
structured interviews and selected journal publications of forensic geneticists.
The data collection was conducted before the finalization of the bill which
passed by the end of 2019. The interviews were conducted between June 2017
and May 2018 with nine professionals from eight institutions developing or
working with forensic genetic technologies in Germany distributed across six
states in Germany. The interviews were conducted under the protocols and pro-
cedures of the European Research Council’s ethics regulations. We selected inter-
viewees based on the search of German authors of scientific articles in the area of
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forensic DNA phenotyping, additional contacts with professionals participating in
conferences and other events relevant to the field, and complemented the selection
with the snowball method applied among interviewees asking for forensic geneti-
cists with a known (potentially diverging) viewpoint on the matter of the “extended
DNA analysis” in particular and the regulation of FDP in Germany in general.
Interviewees were recruited by e-mail and telephone. The script of the interviews
covered the following themes: the organization of the provision of forensic genetics
services in the country, views, and experiences about technological development
and innovations of DNA technologies such as FDP, as well as the public percep-
tions and regulatory process related to technological forensic genetic innovations.
All interviewees signed a written informed consent form and agreed to be audio-
recorded. The interviewers took notes to help to guide questions in the interview
and for reflection after the interview. When the interview was completed, the inter-
viewers reviewed their notes and made annotations about issues and items that
could be addressed in the analysis. Whenever necessary, an editing process was
carried out after the initial transcription. The editing was performed without ever
undermining the original meaning of the narratives or suppressing the individual
voice of the narratives of each interviewee (Poirier, Clapier-Valladon, and
Raybaut 1983, 65). Quotations relevant to the different uses, meanings, and regu-
lation of FDP were coded and subjected to multiple readings to develop an in-depth
understanding of the prevalent notions of expected benefits and risks of FDP tech-
nologies. These quotations were systematically compared, contrasted, synthesized,
and coded by theme and by thematic category following the principles of grounded
theory (Charmaz 2006) and interpreted using a qualitative content analysis
approach (Mayring 2004). In this paper, we analyze the replies that were considered
by the two authors as illustrating the thematic categories that emerged from the
content analysis.
Taking into account previous research (Samuel and Prainsack 2018a, 2018b) on
professional views of actors involved with FDP by building on interviews with
European police, scientists, and representatives of governmental agencies demon-
strating the heterogeneity of views, even across the same professional group, we
considered the aspect of heterogeneity of views when selecting our interviewees,
while assuming that the group overall shares understandings which tend to
welcome the legalization of FDP technologies in Germany. The sample is
assumed to be sufficiently diverse to represent a characteristic variety of views
across the community of forensic geneticists because interviewees confirmed
throughout the snowball method the same protagonists as representing converging
viewpoints among the forensic genetics’ community.
Additionally, three journal publications published between 2018 and 2019
complement the data corpus for the analysis as they provide written articulations
of forensic geneticists’ viewpoints on FDP technologies and/or on the extended
DNA analysis as the regulatory project in Germany from a forensic genetic view-
point in international and German journals considered key journals for the forensic
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community. By incorporating these publications data is considered which allows us
to assess how forensic geneticists attempt to the scientific and policy dialogue
regarding the regulation of FDP. The sample includes the correspondence in scien-
tific debates found in one of the community’s most prominent journals, Forensic
Science International, and one article in the Deutsches Ärzteblatt, and one article
in Rechtsmedizin. We included those articles (co-)authored by forensic geneticists
which were produced while the regulation process was on its way. To our knowl-
edge, there are no additional articles that fit these criteria. We analyze the rec-
ommendations for regulatory solutions of FDP technologies and how they
respond and incorporate specific matters of concern.
Regarding the different type of data collected, analyzed, and interpreted in this
article, we assume that forensic geneticists as a specific epistemic community
perform and articulate themselves on matters related to FDP and its regulation dif-
ferently either as authors of publications addressing audiences of expert publics of
forensic genetics or in semi-structured anonymized expert interviews. Both of them
provide relevant carriers of meanings of expectations about desired and undesired
futures and specific matters of concern related to FDP and its regulation of the epis-
temic community, however, differing with regards to the type of language and sym-
bolic representation of meanings (values and beliefs) (Yanow 2000).
Results
Matters of concern orienting forensic geneticists’ expectations towards FDP
When we began collecting our interview data the regulatory process had been
accompanied already by numerous events involving forensic geneticists, legal
and data protection experts, social scientists, and practitioners from the criminal
justice systems. These included a symposium held by the ministry of justice and
consumer protection on 21 March 2017 which was documented on the ministry’s
website, and a press briefing with various expert opinions held by the Science
Media Center Germany on the same day likewise documented on the host’s
website. Another interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary symposium was held by
the Freiburg Institute for Advanced Studies (FRIAS) on 9 and 10 June 2017
which all dealt with the matter of regulating the “extended DNA analysis” (STS
Freiburg Group 2017). Additionally, notable media attention has shaped the
general publics’ and expert publics’ views as well as the regulatory debate. Accord-
ing to Weitz and Buchanan (2017) who analyzed the media coverage related to the
political project of the “extended DNA analysis”, there were 171 related media
reports published between January 2016 and June 2017. The forensic geneticists
in Germany we talked to were informed about a certain range of views and suppor-
tive or skeptic positions regarding FDP technologies represented in the media and
in such events which they either had attended or heard of. We assume to some
degree shared anticipated expectations of forensic geneticists shaped by the
public discourse accompanying the regulatory debate. Thereby, our interviewees
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referred to the supposed high potential to advance criminal justice of such technol-
ogies assumed by proponents in policy-making, but also confirmed their awareness
of claims about issues of privacy and discrimination had been repeatedly raised by
data protection experts, social scientists, and legal scholars.
Our interviewees demonstrated an overall interest and curiosity in technological
innovations in the field of forensics, welcomed FDP as a set of technologies and
had optimistic expectations that they could make an impact and progress in the for-
ensic field. However, in response and reflection of the regulatory debate about the
“extended DNA analysis” forensic geneticists adjusted and sorted their expec-
tations along with specific matters of concern as we demonstrate in this section.
Forensic geneticists considered novel technologies as proof of possibility and the
creation of impact in the forensic field, as the following quotation, referring to FDP
and the 1990s when DNA analysis slowly became the “gold standard” (Lynch et al.
2008) in forensic science, demonstrates. In the words of one of the interviewees:
[DNA] phenotyping is also a new phase and logic for us, who are scientists in foren-
sics, that we are interested in. Yeah. We start to be interested in new technologies
when [they] arrive or even try to differentiate a little bit the new technology
whether in terms of why now, what is the context in Germany? (…) what is the
impact of a new method? (interviewee O06)
Among forensic geneticists exists a certain taken-for-granted belief in the utility
and relevance of innovation and technological progress which help to predict the
outer appearance of unidentified individuals per se in their field:
Being able to generate a genetic photofit image from an unknown person, that would
be a true innovation of course. But I think it will take more like 5–10 years until we
get there. (interviewee O01)
The trust in innovation goes without referring to greater claims about its contri-
bution to increasing security, which in contrast plays a major role in the regulatory
debate to make claims about the innovation’s legitimacy.
Our interviewees manage their own and others’ expectations towards FDP tech-
nologies in a manner that they tend to lower and adjust expectations regarding such
technologies along with specific matters of concern, in response to expectations
raised in the public regulatory debate. They aim to reduce and to alter expectations
regarding matters of the accuracy of prediction, readiness, and preparedness of the
forensic field and investigative value in the criminal investigation.
Demands for further research and development to meet expectations about the
accuracy
In the German context of research development, a reoccurring concern evolved
along with matters of the accuracy of FDP technologies which refers most often
to the accuracy of prediction. Hopman (2020) described the accuracy of the tech-
nology as being in the focus in particular in the context of the development of the
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FDP technologies in the Dutch research laboratory she investigated to help the
search for the genetic phenotypical uniqueness of the individual, and what differ-
entiates one from another. Forensic geneticists distinguished between the different
characteristics of appearance and age, as well as biogeographic ancestry to consider
varying degrees of accuracies of prediction. The forensic geneticists’ understand-
ings related to the separate technologies are based on different scientific methods
and probabilistic values and, therefore, vary regarding their accuracy and reliability
of their prediction. Genetic information used for predicting EVC’s and epigenetic
information used for age estimation play one important difference between the
methods differently influencing the accuracy of prediction. As one interviewee
said:
I think that the best predictive phenotype at the moment is eye color. I think there’s no
way of denying that. The second best is the hair color. We also have a special kind of
age prediction. It is relatively advanced now, but this is a kind of a different model: it
doesn’t use genetic information but epigenetic information, so it uses other kinds of
markers. (interviewee O08)
Aiming at better and accurate prediction results is considered the major achieve-
ment which needs to be gained in forensic genetic research. Accuracy as part of
technology development is also considered as a normative neutral scientific
ideal, while the further transfer and use of FDP technologies in a criminal investi-
gation are decoupled as to be deliberated societally:
For most EVCs, externally visible characteristics, one can expect a polygenic com-
ponent, where we do not yet know many factors. To improve the accuracy of the pre-
diction that in itself is neutral. How to use it then is a societal discussion. But if I can
make an accurate prediction that may be methodologically interesting, I think more
genetic research needs to be done to detect genetic factors. We need sample sizes
large enough to provide these studies with enough statistical power. (interviewee
O10)
A slightly different concern regarding accuracy derives when taking the prediction
of biogeographic ancestry into account. While the prediction of EVC’s relies on
genetic information, and age prediction additionally relies on epigenetic infor-
mation, biogeographic ancestry furthermore only can be analyzed with supplemen-
tary insights from population studies. Forensic geneticists assume that predicting
biogeographic ancestry is scientifically feasible in forensic testing, at least at the
continental level (Vidaki and Kayser 2017). Yet, they also specify, that genetic geo-
graphic population substructures are influenced by human migration and differ
across the globe (ibid). On these grounds the following quotation illustrates what
influences the accuracy of prediction of biogeographic ancestry:
About biogeographical ancestry, we need more studies to more accurately determine
the prevalence of different characteristics in different parts of the world, in different
population groups, because so far very, very little data exists. (interviewee O10)
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The need for investment in research and development is emphasized in the follow-
ing quotation, which argues that it must be accommodated alongside casework. The
distinction between different forensic cultures, for example, research science and
forensic science, as characterized by a substantive divide between research and
casework (Cole 2013) is problematized here. Thus, the current forensic community
is perceived as being confronted with a big but inevitable challenge if FDP is to
become established over time. In the words of one of the interviewees:
I guess that many of my colleagues (…) don’t have the chance to do research. If you
want to do phenotyping you do have to spend a lot on research and development of
course. In Germany, if you think of implementing, it must be tested and now it’s pro-
hibited. We’re not allowed to do it in cases only. Research then doesn’t make real
sense, it should be also done in combination with casework. (interviewee O09)
Although most geneticists consider the levels of accuracy of prediction sufficient to
be used in a criminal investigation, they tend to argue in favor of further research
and development of FDP technologies and generating more data to strategically
increase its relevance in forensic contexts (Hopman 2020, 7). Additionally, inter-
viewees emphasized the combination of forensic research and testing technologies
in casework as a prerequisite to prepare the implementation of FDP.
Reconfiguring expectations about the preparedness and readiness of the
forensic field
Forensic geneticists are concerned about the transfer of FDP from the research and
development stage to the implementation stage in forensic labs. They shared cau-
tious expectations regarding the preparedness and readiness of the field of forensic
labs to implement these still emergent technologies on a large scale. The following
quotation addresses a central concern linked to the forensic validation of the tech-
nologies which is seen as a prerequisite before applying this set of techniques in
forensic laboratories:
The scientific proof of concept is something very different from the forensic vali-
dation that we need to perform before we can actually use these kinds of methods.
I think most people working on forensic genetics in Germany are waiting to see
what comes. [They are] a bit anxious maybe because there is a huge expectation
that at the moment simply cannot be fulfilled. And they’re thinking about (…)
how do they get the information they [will] need, and how can they do the forensic
validation. (interviewee O13)
The following quotation from a forensic geneticist working in a police lab reveals a
pragmatic view on the transfer process of new technologies from the research and
development stage to the implementation stage:
We are now in a process that we need to take the things from the universities into
practice. And therefore, we have to re-validate everything, to see what we can do
with it, where are the limitations, and this process needs a while. (interviewee O02)
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The interviewee considers the technologies’ research development as sufficiently
mature but emphasizes that the process of re-validating technologies for their
actual implementation in the forensic policy lab is a prerequisite before being
able to use it. This partially refers to what Hopman (2020, 10) has reflected on
the use of FDP technologies in forensic labs where forensic analysis tools need
to be adjusted to produce “useful” results under conditions of limited resources.
In the forensic lab, the focus lies on the commonalities and to situate the common-
alities in the context of the countries’ major population to identify how common a
result is.
Lowering expectations about the investigative value in the criminal
investigation
Other central matters of concern along with the translation of FDP technologies into
the context of a criminal investigation assemble around the issue of the investiga-
tive value of FDP. That relates closely to what Hopman (2020) called the logic of
valuing as guiding rationale in a police investigation when results of FDP forensic
analyses translate into a criminal investigation, e.g. the weighing pieces of forensic
intelligence and narrowing down attention to specific population groups. The regu-
latory promises enacted by policymakers, which serve public goals of contributing
substantially to a securer society, are re-assessed by forensic geneticists. Forensic
geneticists readjust and specify expectations about the utility of FDP in criminal
investigation raised in the regulatory debate.
Our interviewees recommended that the technology be used initially “only for
special situations, so for kind of serious crimes” (O08 – forensic geneticist), or
expected its use to be minimal: “We all think we don’t really need to be so very
excited because it will only be used in very, very limited number of cases and
very specific kinds of samples” (interviewee O13) Against high public demand
for a suitable and feasible solution, many forensic geneticists suggest that the pre-
diction of EVCs and age are legitimate techniques in specific and limited situations
of a criminal investigation. The prediction of biogeographic ancestry is occasion-
ally problematized regarding its added investigative value considering its contri-
bution to narrow down a pool of potential suspects (Hopman 2020, 12).
How biogeographic ancestry orients criminal investigation depends on various
contextual information and processes of considering and weighing investigative
leads. FDP predicting biogeographic ancestry then can be used to prioritize
certain suspect groups of people over others (Hopman 2020, 12). To narrow
down the group of suspects the indication of a European genetic background is con-
sidered “useless” as it does not narrow down the pool of suspects. Instead, a result
is considered “useful” if it leads to minority groups as the following quotation
illustrates:
It [biogeographic ancestry] may be useful, but it may also be useless. For example, if
the investigation results that this is a typical European genetic background, what do
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you know? You know that the person is European. So maybe you can exclude some
Africans and some people from the Middle East or some other areas, but that is about
it. On the other end, if you know that somebody came from South Asia or Afghani-
stan […] then you might look more into a particular group of people. (interviewee
O01)
A different matter relates to biogeographic ancestry to its visibility. It does not
necessarily translate into phenotypic externally visible characteristics as the follow-
ing quotation illustrates with regards to the Bavarian legislation which included
biogeographic ancestry into the set of allowed technologies:
If now in the Bavarian law, this bio-geographical origin is to be determined, then you
can do that, but that would be I say to a large extent a waste of money because as I
said that is only a representative feature that is not necessarily externally visible. That
said, I can say this person is probably from Syria, but I cannot tell what they looked
like. But then all of a sudden, cliché images and prejudices and perhaps racist ideas
come in place. So, I think you can determine the bio-geographical origin, but it hardly
has any added value. It has to be incorporated sensibly into the prediction, but on its
own, it does not have much added value. (interviewee O10)
This interviewee problematizes biogeographic ancestry with regards to the moment
in a criminal investigation when the forensic result – which does not provide pre-
dictions about specific visible characteristics – mixes with stereotyped images of
investigators about specific population groups. Some forensic geneticists engage
with concerns actively argued by social scientists about how such differences cor-
respond with socially constructed categories used to classify and describe popu-
lation groups, which may have a discriminating effect (Granja, Machado, and
Queirós 2020; Toom 2016).
A few forensic geneticists state clearly – beyond the matter of the investigative
value – that they anticipate fundamental social and ethical problems with selected
technologies of FDP. As the following quotation demonstrates, taking the recent
influx of migrants during the so-called refugee crisis into account, the interviewee
even opposes the prediction of skin color fundamentally:
I think […] I don’t want to have it in Germany. My statement is maybe not the most
profound and not most important, but at least I’ll not see a test in Germany for our
skin color. I don’t want to have it. I don’t want to have mass screening that is
based on skin color. And yeah, I think that this is a very clear statement, which
has to do with stereotypes about migrants, and the relation to the refugee crisis in
question, as you want to call it. But from the forensic point of view and the societal
and ethical point of view, I think I don’t want it because of the possibility of creating
stereotypes […]. Maybe this may change, but I’m not sure. (interviewee O06)
If interviewees problematized particular features of FDP for the risk of discrimi-
nation and racism they either referred to predicting skin color or bio-geographic
ancestry. The slippery nature of race (M’charek 2020) in the German case is
evident: race is an absent presence because it is a taboo subject, often removed
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and excluded from discourse and viewed as something that belongs to the proble-
matic past of scientific racism and Nazi genocide (M’charek, Schramm, and
Skinner 2014, 462).
Forensic geneticists reflect and respond in their understandings of FDP technol-
ogies to “the promise of the new science while managing expectations about its
capacities” (Skinner 2020, 3). Forensic geneticists try to lower and reconfigure
expectations by addressing specific matters of concern: concrete scientific limits
in differences of accurate prediction, limited preparedness of the forensic field,
or limited and specific investigative value in the criminal investigation.
Forensic geneticists’ proposals for regulating FDP and the governance of
expectations
While the previous section was dedicated to forensic geneticists understandings
and expectations towards FDP as analyzed based on interview material, this
section analyses how selected forensic geneticists actively engaged in the govern-
ance of expectations by publishing their positioning on the ongoing regulatory
process of the “extended DNA analysis” in Germany in dedicated professional
journals. Some forensic geneticists intervened in the scientific and regulatory
debates on matters of how to govern FDP and proposed different models of propor-
tionate implementation that make use of particular technical or regulatory fixes to
overcome scientific, social, and ethical ambiguities. Thus, while speculating about
the potential of innovative technologies related to the prediction of appearance, age,
and biogeographic ancestry, forensic geneticists engage in the governance of
expectations (Hielscher and Kivimaa 2019). They attempt to counter and adjust
expectations around seemingly omnipotent technologies by making concrete pro-
posals about what they perceive as proportionate forms of regulation.
We consider three pieces of public articulations as described earlier. In all three
cases, the major audience is the expert public of forensic genetics interested in the
German process of regulating FDP, but obviously, the publications are also avail-
able for a wider interested public.
The correspondence in Forensic Science International reveals how the regulat-
ory debate in Germany feeds back into the experts’ debate about the accurate devel-
opment and proportionate use of FDP. By referring to FDP, the scholars involved
explicitly excluded biogeographic ancestry. A group of forensic geneticists had
published an article about the conditional probabilities of FDP that argued in
favor of advancing with FDP development and research to implement it (Caliebe
et al. 2017). As a response, another group of forensic geneticists and scholars of
the social and legal aspects of forensic genetics expressed their skepticism
about the utility, accuracy, and readiness of FDP for legalization. They explicitly
situated the debate in the context of the ongoing German regulatory debate:
“First, we would like to clarify the relevance of this dialogue for the ongoing
public and political debate over Forensic DNA Phenotyping (FDP) in Germany”
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(Buchanan 2018: e13). After having claimed the significance for the ongoing leg-
islative process in Germany, in further response, Caliebe, Krawczak, and Kayser
(2018) differentiated the requirements that would need to be in place before the
techniques could be legitimately applied in forensic casework:
The above notwithstanding, since the etiological understanding of FDP-relevant
appearance phenotypes is still incomplete, so are the prediction models used – and
the corresponding predictive values vary to a certain degree. In consequence, these
measures have to be determined empirically for each appearance phenotype, predic-
tion model, and target population of interest before they can be applied sensibly in
criminal casework. (Caliebe, Krawczak, and Kayser 2018, e7–e8)
This proposal argues that prerequisites of empirical validation should be in place
before implementation of FDP could be considered, reveals the forensic geneti-
cists’ cautious expectations of the emergent technology, but it also resonates
with the previously analyzed matters of concerns regarding improvable accuracy
of prediction and readiness of the forensic field. With regards to its governing ambi-
tion, it aimed at reducing public expectations about the immediate availability and
applicability of FDP in casework, and consequences in the criminal investigation.
The commentary includes a call for anticipatory practices of advancing validation
which Wienroth (2018, 11) also called an anticipatory ordering device.
Schneider, Prainsack, and Kayser (2019) proposed the use of all technologies at
stake in conjunction with each other – the prediction of hair, eye, and skin color as
well as of age and biogeographic ancestry – by referring to their sufficiently high
accuracy. However, they argued that “[e]ven those who support the use of forensic
DNA phenotyping in specific cases emphasize that these methods should not be
used in police investigations until appropriate measures have been taken to
ensure that they are used transparently and proportionately” (Schneider, Prainsack,
and Kayser 2019, 879). They referred to empirical social-scientific research on for-
ensic DNA phenotyping which identified preserving privacy and protecting against
discrimination as major ethical and regulatory considerations. They emphasized in
a dedicated section the specifics of biogeographic ancestry and try to decouple bio-
geographic ancestry as a genetic concept from concepts such as “ethnicity” and
“race” as cultural concepts by arguing that “it solely concerns the geographical
region(s) from which a person’s biological ancestors originated” (Schneider, Prain-
sack, and Kayser 2019, 877). They called for steps to be taken which minimize the
risks of violation of privacy and ethnic discrimination (Schneider, Prainsack, and
Kayser 2019, 878). As concrete safeguards, they proposed that the “training of for-
ensic DNA experts and investigators is essential to ensure that the laboratory find-
ings are correctly generated, interpreted, documented, and transmitted to the
investigating authorities and that the authorities understand them correctly and
use them properly” (Schneider, Prainsack, and Kayser 2019, 879).
The authors referred to the comparably high predictive accuracy – and thereby
did not confirm some concerns about the contested sufficiency of accuracy
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which were raised in some of our interviews. Yet, they mobilized the logic of accu-
racy (Hopman 2020) to stabilize claims about the scientific legitimacy and trust-
worthiness of FDP technologies. They call for anticipatory practices of training
of all actors involved in the adoption of FDP technologies to ensure its “correct”
use. We assume that “correct” can be understood as a reference to agreed-upon
rules and standards of what correct practices are and then seems to correspond to
what Wienroth identified as a separate anticipatory ordering device. With regards
to biogeographic ancestry and its public problematization in the regulatory
debate to come along with discriminatory or racist potential, the authors try to
argue in a conceptual and ontological manner. By distinguishing a genetic
concept from a cultural concept they aim to purify the prediction of biogeographic
ancestry into “neutral”, unbiased and apolitical technology which only becomes
problematic if its use in criminal investigation meets ethnic discriminatory preju-
dices. With this separation, the authors distribute and delegate the accountability
for discriminatory risks to other actors in criminal investigation translating analysis
results into investigative leads.
The forensic geneticists Zieger and Roewer (2019) reflected on the introduction
and regulation of the so-called “extended forensic DNA analysis” in Germany (and
Switzerland). Zieger and Roewer (2019, 417) argued for a regulation that “should
avoid a too narrow restriction to [the prediction of, the authors] certain character-
istics and at the same time should protect the fundamental rights of the persons con-
cerned as far as possible”. In their view, the prediction of eye and hair color seemed
to be the less controversial candidates among the forensic genetic community,
while the prediction of age, skin color, and biogeographic ancestry are for one
reason or another more contested. They acknowledged that this is “a task that is
difficult to solve” as a “rigid definition of the legally permissible spectrum of ana-
lyses will inevitably lead to an unsatisfactory result, whether from the perspective
of fundamental rights or the perspective of criminal prosecution” (Zieger and
Roewer 2019, 417, own translation). They mobilized a framing of a seemingly
inevitable tradeoff and conflict between security and individual liberty, privacy,
and civic rights overall (Pavone, Santiago Gomez, and Jaquet-Chifelle 2016). In
conclusion, they made a regulatory proposal in favor of a national ethical commis-
sion which should decide on a case-by-case basis regarding efficiency and propor-
tionality of the use of the extended DNA analysis. They referred to the Dutch
example of a special committee but proposed to expand such a body beyond
police and criminal prosecution staff and to include forensic geneticists and ethi-
cists. Instead of the specific determination and selection of technologies via law,
they suggested establishing definitions of guiding rules together with an ethics
committee aiming at a flexible solution which mediates between scientific and tech-
nological progress and intrusion of privacy rights (Zieger and Roewer 2019, 417).
The last proposal seems to be most far-reaching with regards to the elaboration of
institutionalized regulatory safeguards and procedural assessments permanently
accompanying the technology development. It reminds of models developed
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in the literature on ethical and constructive technology assessments (Rip and
Robinson 2013). By clearly naming ethical and civil rights dimensions of the regu-
lation it goes beyond the logic inherently applied in the contexts of forensic geneti-
cists which we identified in the analysis of the interview material. They aim to
balance scientific-technological progress and societal potential harm and do so in
a way to assign distributed responsibility to a heterogeneous actor set that goes
beyond anticipatory self-governance.
Syndercombe-Court et al. (2016) observed that privacy issues and privacy rights
have been at the center of ethical interrogations of forensic genetics from its first
appearance in the mid-1980s. Due to the conceptual looseness of privacy and the
manifold conditions under which privacy rights maybe be breached caused in
the past complex and extensive legal and ethical deliberations (ibid). For that
reason, “privacy” as well as “ethnic discrimination” seem to remain approached
in a simplified manner, in particular taking into account that training of forensic
DNA experts and investigators – holding forensic geneticists and criminal justice
actors accountable – might be one out of several anticipatory governance practices
as Wienroth (2020) suggests. Efforts of responsible forms of standardization could
apply here and add to ways of how forensic geneticists may hold themselves and
other criminal justice actors’ accountable. This could be part of general “efforts
to harmonize training and methodologies for testing, analysis, and interpretation
of specific phenotyping technologies” (Wienroth 2018, 11) and assign clear respon-
sibilities for who is in charge of these distributed anticipatory practices to be put in
place.
Conclusion
The technologies of predicting skin color and biogeographic ancestry provoked
some contestation regarding their societal exigency and legitimacy. FDP forensic
technologies served for reflections on the ambiguous relationship-making
between an individual suspect and specific suspect population groups and were
assumed to attract the mobilization of racism and discriminatory potential. Yet, for-
ensic geneticists perceived risks of discrimination and privacy intrusion as
decoupled from the technology itself and instead assumed the possibility to
resolve considerations of proportionality of the intrusion of fundamental rights
by case-by-case decision making. With calls for anticipatory practices, such as
training for DNA experts and investigators or institutionalized forms of ethical
technology assessments including a range of expertise from police and criminal
prosecution staff to forensic geneticists and ethicists, they named the potential
for discrimination risks but also propose how to cope with that.
Being overall in favor of the regulation of FDP technologies forensic geneticists
also tended to adjust, minimize or redirect the expectations of the criminal justice
system, to keep the integrity of the forensic genetics’ epistemic community. These
findings correspond to what Brown and Michael (2003, 14) concluded about the
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proximity of actors to knowledge production of emergent technologies and the per-
formance of expectations as deploying prospects of futures of technologies that
enable specific technoscientific worlds. The closer proximity of forensic geneticists
to primary research relates to being equally cautious of the ambitious promises of
technologies as “lessons learned” from the overall enthusiastic public reception of
forensic DNA technologies (Amelung, Granja, and Machado 2020).
However, what our findings show beyond confirming key parameters for the
variation of expectation is that selected advocates from forensic genetics also
applied modes of “governing expectations” by proposing regulatory solutions.
They can also be understood as attempts of (self)regulation of expectations
towards the uptake in the criminal justice system and its epistemic community of
forensic genetics and thereby as a contribution to the actual governance of
technologies.
Some forensic geneticists actively engaged in the governance of expectations by
contributing with their own proposals of (self)regulation of technologies. With the
latter, our article also speaks to debates on forensic geneticists’ anticipatory (self)
governance. The study of the German case adds to that debate, that forensic gen-
eticist’s attempts of (self)regulation reflect the anticipation of specific matters of
concern partially deriving from the public regulatory debate, but mainly reflecting
logics aiming to maintain and expand credibility and legitimacy of forensic gen-
etics in the criminal justice system and to wider publics of security policies.
They pick up matters of concern evolving inherently from forensic genetics’
logics and rationalities around the predictive accuracy, the preparedness of the for-
ensic field, and the investigative value for criminal investigation. Additionally,
some forensic geneticists responded to dominant concerns deriving from the
public regulatory debate regarding privacy and discrimination potential. By pro-
posing regulatory models they addressed anticipated optimistic regulator’s expec-
tations and translated their technologies approving but more cautious expectations
into interventionist practices aiming to influence the technologies’ trajectory.
As much as we believe that we find in the German case discursive calls of for-
ensic geneticists’ for anticipatory self-governance practices, we also argue that in
particular, the regulatory proposals analyzed in this article to configure FDP tech-
nologies contributed by forensic geneticists indicate the attempt to hold a set of het-
erogeneous actors including forensic geneticists and other actors of the criminal
justice system accountable for legitimate and proportionate uptake of FDP technol-
ogies. In line with previous findings, we can identify at least two forms of distribut-
ing and assigning accountability (Granja and Machado 2020, 8). First, forensic
geneticists held themselves accountable regarding the concerns along with the
accuracy and validity of technologies that influence the preparedness of the forensic
field. Second, some of them distributed and delegated accountability and responsi-
bility for harm prevention when for instance suggesting training for the actors
involved in a criminal investigation when interpreting the investigative value and
interpreting the FDP results into account as investigative leads. We refer to
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distributed anticipatory governance to emphasize the segmentation of logic sorting
those matters of concern along work practices from technology development to
implementation and the assumed fragmented accountability. In consequence,
assigning concerns to distinct sites of forensic work with different work practices
allowed forensic geneticists to apply differentiated boundary work (Granja and
Machado 2020), attributing own obligations, responsibilities, and accountabilities,
but also delegating and distributing obligations, responsibilities, and accountabil-
ities and governing expectations towards other actors’ roles in shaping the trajec-
tory of FDP technologies in Germany. Acknowledging the limits of a small data
set available for this study we also wish to emphasize that there is more work
required to reflect the wider state of play and views of the German forensic gen-
etics’ community. Further research may help to make more specific claims about
boundary work, accountability, and responsibility assigning distribution between
the forensic genetic scientists’ social world and the criminal justice system’s
social world.
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